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HISTORY AND THE FUTURE
LAW SCHOOL CURRICULUM
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HERE are generally two approaches to the teaching of history
in law schools today. In some schools it is taught as a separate
subject. The emphasis is on English legal history, and the teaching
matter is dominated by the English tradition of legal historiography.
This tradition stresses the medieval period of English law, and to a
lesser extent the Renaissance. The modern period is almost wholly
neglected. Partly this is so because some of the greatest English legal
historians were medievalists. Maitland is the best known example.
But there is more to the story. Plucknett's Concise History of the
Common Law,' the leading textbook on the subject, devotes more
than 90 percent of its pages to the period ending with the enactment
of the Statute of Uses. The book runs to some 750 pages. It is
doubtful if fifty pages deal with the last three centuries of British
legal life. The discussion of real property devotes 83 pages to medieval times, ending with the passage of the Statute of Uses, in the
sixteenth century. After this, the treatment dribbles away into a mere
sketch. Not a word on twentieth century developments appears.
Plucknett's allocation of space would be most peculiar for a
book which purported to treat generally the history of English law.
If one read a history of England, or China, or the United States, one
would find a very different sort of organization. Typically, the author
would rush through the early parts and slow down the closer he got
to the present. He would do so for two general reasons: first, because more is known about more recent times; and second, because
the more recent is usually more relevant.
Now it is clear that Plucknett - and teachers of English legal
history in general - have some other, very different theory of relevance. This theory of relevance is revealed in Plucknett's title. He
has written a concise history not of English law but of the common
law, which is by no means coextensive with the whole of English
law. The common law, he assumes, is an entity that was fully formed
by the time of Henry VIII. Accordingly, most of that which has
gone on since then is not part of the core history of the common law.
It is in some ways a further unfolding of common law or a further
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emanation from its principles; perhaps it is even decay. But the important thing was the development of the common law, and this
was a medieval job.
Under this view, American legal history has nothing much to
contribute to the story. And sure enough, very little is taught in
American schools. The teaching of American legal history seems
even less to American tastes than the teaching of English legal history.
Relatively few schools offer a course in legal history at all; even
fewer offer courses in American legal history.2 American legal history is distinctly an academic backwater.
The second approach to the teaching of legal history is to insert
it piecemeal in non-history courses. Particularly in real property
courses rather large chunks of old law are inserted into the regular
course work. It is an apparent advantage of this approach that these
chunks come to the attention of all students, not just the few who
might elect legal history. This approach, one might argue, makes
up for the lack of a separate course in history. The argument is
specious, however. The people who teach the courses by and large
have no competence in legal history. Their history has been pulled
out of its social and economic context. It is totally meaningless to
the student and to the professor. Moreover, it is exceedingly technical and boring.
This approach, too, is heavily dependent upon medieval English
legal history. The case books purporting to deal with real property
and with the formation of the law of tenure and estates are American books by Americans and used in American schools; but their
historical aspect is exclusively English. These books devote time to
the Statute of Quia Emptores; but they are unlikely even to mention
the Homestead Act of 1862. The development of American land
tenure is a colorful and relevant story. But no one teaches it or gives
it its due. The pseudo-history of the second approach is useless under
any theory. The sooner it is eliminated the better. Professors and
students are embarrassed by it. Perhaps it even poisons the general
taste for legal history.
One of the causes of the low state of teaching in this subject is
the low state of the art. In America, the most distinguished historians of law were concerned, like their English contemporaries, primarily with English law in the medieval period. Oliver Wendell
Holmes' The Common Law is a case in point. Holmes seems far
more concerned with the ancient origins of bailment than with the
cutting edge of American law in the nineteenth century. In part,
2
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American scholars emphasized English antecedents because they
shared the view that the common law was the proper field of study
and that the common law was an English development adopted
without essential change in this country. This theory of course is
no longer tenable. Moreover, English legal history has ceased largely
to be practiced and to be written in this country, with some notable
exceptions, such as Samuel Thorne.
American legal history has never fully gained the prestige that
English legal history has lost. It has, however, shown a good deal
of life in recent years. The American journal of Legal History,
founded about 12 years ago, devotes more than half its space to
American legal history. There is a society devoted to the cause.
A number of excellent legal historians are at work in the law schools.
A disproportionate amount of energy, however, is still going into
legal antiquities. The only major legal historian who works on the
nineteenth century or later is Wisconsin's Willard Hurst. Other fine
American historians - George Haskins of Pennsylvania and Joseph
Smith of Columbia, for example - specialize in the colonial period.
There is no such thing as medieval times in the United States. The
closest one can get is early Massachusetts.
There are those who love legal history, for its own sake. Naturally, they decry its lowly state. But for the rest of the world of
legal education, the tough-minded question has to be asked: how
harmful is the current neglect? Is there any real need for legal history in the law school curriculum? I have no hesitation in saying that
conventional legal history is unnecessary. The piecemeal approach
is positively harmful. Conventional whole courses are fine; they may
be superb. For those who want to teach them, and those who want
to study these courses, they are or can be rich, stimulating experiences.
They are to be encouraged because we wish to encourage intellect,
variety, and humanity in legal education. But no school need despair
if it lacks this kind of history. If the school has limited funds and
its history incumbent gets a better job or dies or tires of history, the
school might as well consider a sociologist or an African law specialist as another historian of law.
On the other hand, there is a sense in which legal history, particularly American legal history, could serve a vital role - almost an
indispensable role - in the curriculum. And that is if the course
concerns itself with the legal past not as history, not for the sake of
history, not for any interest in origins or any antiquarian interest, but
simply because of the need, if law is to be integrated with the social
sciences, to understand the temporal and developmental aspects
of institutions. This means looking at how they respond to specific
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economic and social problems in the course of their experience. Any
history can be used for this purpose - ancient history, the history
of Greek law or Roman law, or Chinese law for that matter. But the
job can most easily be done with American materials. The history of
American law in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries presents
to the student the fewest technical barriers. The language is English.
The books are at hand. Here the data is the fullest. Here the relevance to current problems is the greatest, and student interest is
likely to be at the highest.
In a course on American legal history, many social problems
might be illuminated. The confrontation of the races is one such
problem. There is fascinating material on the history of the law of
slavery. There is the dark chapter of race law in the reconstruction
period and thereafter. It is all one story, from the introduction of
slave labor up to and even past Brown v. Board of Education,' with
important interconnections and ramifications. The present state and
future prospects of tort law can be made much clearer, I think, by
considering what past experience shows to be the influence of technological and economic change on tort law. 4 Similarly, the progression from the poor laws through Social Security to the OEO is all of
one piece. The laws of behavior that produce one program are the
same as those which produce another. What changes are circumstances; and these should be studied in context. I would like students
of land use problems in modern urban and suburban settings to bear
in mind the tangled story of the growth of their system of control
from nuisance law through the restrictive covenant to zoning and
subdivision ordinance. But I would like each phase considered not
as an interesting curio, but as a piece of data, as a point to be used
on a social scientist's curves, charts, and graphs. I would like history
to be treated as the record of past experiments, conducted by men
and by the invisible hand.
In other words, history might be used not to show how much
strength or continuity stems from tradition, from the history of the
legal system, but in a sense to show exactly the opposite. It could
be used to show how, in any particular period, the new emerges from
the mixture of that which is historically given, and the social and
economic currents of the time. Precisely this problem -of
adjustment- faces every historical period. History as the story of that
eternal confrontation is the very opposite of antiquarianism. And
it is in the highest degree relevant to the needs of current legal
education.
S5347 U.S. 483 (1954).
4 A notably successful attempt at making such a correlation is Malone, The Formative Era
of ContributoryNegligence, 41 ILL. L. REv. 151 (1946).
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I have described what I consider the ideal role of American
legal history in the law school. The problems it faces are enormous.
There is a critical shortage of personnel. This leads to a vicious
circle. No one is training American legal historians. The demand
is small, the number trained is small. The number trained is small,
the demand is small. Only a handful of people are working in this
field. It is not heavily supported by foundations or by government.
There is a shortage of teaching materials. What is sorely needed
are materials which would serve as a sociological and economic history of American law, a history of American law which would infuse
the subject with whatever we know (or can guess) on the basis of
social science data. Nothing of the sort is available. Something has
to happen to break the cycle, if there is going to be any kind of vital
legal history offered in our law schools. Social scientists themselves
must bear some small part of the blame. They have shied away from
historic data. They have preferred, in recent years, to approach behavior through controlled experiment, survey research techniques,
and the statistical analysis of current data. But there are still some
who look on history with respect. And lately history itself has become much more interested in the social sciences. American legal
history - particularly the last hundred years of it - would lend itself
admirably to the use of social science techniques. In general, data
is available. The data is not as full as one would like; but it is much
fuller than in the remote past; and far more accessible. Good historical studies have been done using such mundane bits of information as are supplied by building permits or census reports.5 An excellent doctoral thesis used Philadelphia bankruptcy statistics in a
study of the history of the mortgage.'
Enormous data banks are available in county courts. Court records are sometimes difficult to work with, but they are there. For
those interested in property systems, there are real estate records in
(comparatively speaking) marvelous preservation. Unbroken series
of will records go back in some communities to the seventeenth century. The use of these might enable us to trace very precisely the
connection between changes in legal institutions and changes in family structure, the economics of family property, family settlements,
land tenure, and a whole host of other subjects.7
This kind of work is beginning to be done by historians, and
if it develops in any bulk, a relevant American legal history becomes
more and more likely. This would be the kind of legal history which
5See S. WARNER, JR.,
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is developmental in its approach; it would be sociologically, economically, and politically oriented. Courses of this kind are already
taught in a few schools. It is the kind of history that is associated
with the work of Willard Hurst.8 It is not, in my view, the only
valid or even useful approach; but it is the most relevant approach,
and the one which has the most legitimate claim on the scarce resources and time available in American law schools.
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